

**SENSITIVE**

*CIA/SAVA /WVIND 711120*



## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 20 November 1971*


**NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971  
Weekly average for each month





AUGUST 1971 - NOVEMBER 1971  
Weekly data as reported

## US BATTLE DEATHS





remained at the same level as last week with five reported.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS





rose to 159 from last week's 136. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE





stand at ten detected and nine "gap fill" groups totaling some 10,800. The number of infiltrators noted since 1 October 1971 now stand at an estimated 13,100 to 14,600.

## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS





dropped to 279 from the 358 of last week.

## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



increased to 1,010 from the 900 reported last week.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces remained at the same level as last week -- 98%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, the level of enemy-initiated activity was comparatively low during the past week. The most significant actions occurred in Pleiku Province, where North Vietnamese elements (probably a battalion) overran a village but were forced out by air strikes. Earlier in the week, South Vietnamese forces were engaged by elements of the B-3 Front's 95-B Regiment. Two battalions of the 95-B Regiment struck elements of the 23rd ARVN Division in southern Pleiku Province, and in so doing may have pre-empted South Vietnamese plans for a strike into Communist Base Areas 701 and 702 just over the border in Cambodia. In the DMZ area, the Communists have reorganized their command and control apparatus, unifying what had been two separate command and control entities into a single, as yet undesignated, headquarters. This administrative streamlining may reflect preparation for intensified offensive activity.

The level of military activity in Cambodia during the past week ranged from moderate to heavy and consisted primarily of Communist attacks by fire. Immediately west of Phnom Penh, the Communists now have been forced out of Tuol Leap and that village is occupied by government forces but overall enemy pressure in the capital area remains serious. Over the weekend, two friendly operations were launched in the capital area to meet the Communist threat. A three-battalion drive has been started northwest of Phnom Penh at Odong and is moving to the southwest. South of the capital, a four-battalion operation has been kicked off near Prek Sieng with the mission to sweep northeast through an area believed to be infested with enemy forces. In the CHENLA II area, FANK troops remain in Tang Kouk and Baray and have not yet tried to gain control of Route 6 between the two towns. Phase VI of RVNAF Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 into Cambodia has been initiated. The main effort will be an attack west along Route 7. After establishing a support base some 20 kilometers west of the village of Chup, two columns will attack north and south of Route 7 into the Chup and Peam Cheang plantations. Included in the overall operational concept is a diversionary effort near Mimot and a two-regiment force in reserve for heliborne assaults into landing zones northeast of the Chup Plantation. This overall ARVN operation, welcomed by the Cambodian Government, will not directly ease the pressure around Phnom Penh, but may have that net result by its overall impact on friendly and enemy force dispositions.

In Laos, friendly forces northeast of the Royal Capital at Luang Prabang still have the initiative and farther south around the Plaine des Jarres have been holding their own against enemy attacks by fire. In the Panhandle, an enemy offensive has driven government troops out of the immediate vicinity of Muong Phalane, but farther south, three new government operations have been launched against North Vietnamese roads, supply areas, and a safehaven in the southwestern corner of the Panhandle.

Enemy Infiltration

Increased truck movement through the border passes into south Laos indicates that the enemy's dry season logistics campaign is underway. The Communists' personnel infiltration effort has apparently moved into high gear with the first significant movement since June 1971 of groups destined for South Vietnam-Cambodia. Ten groups were recently detected in the pipeline with the gaps in the sequential numbering of the groups suggesting that another nine groups are also moving down the trail. The ten detected groups and the nine "gap-fill" groups total some 10,800 men and significantly raise the estimate of infiltrators moving toward South Vietnam-Cambodia since 1 October 1971 to 13,100-14,600. Additionally, the North Vietnamese have continued to strengthen their forces in Laos. During the week, some 1,100 men were detected moving to south Laos to join the estimated 6,400 North Vietnamese who deployed there earlier, and three groups were noted moving to north Laos raising the estimate of infiltrators to that area since 15 October to some 6,000-6,800.

South Vietnam Developments

The economic reform package announced by President Thieu on 15 November has not been accompanied by any major price rises in South Vietnam's markets. The calm reaction is probably due to the fact that significant price fluctuations had already occurred during the two weeks prior to the announcement, fed by rumors of Thieu's projected action and supplemented by the U.S. Senate action on foreign aid. Most of the merchants and the population generally have adopted a "wait and see" attitude. The markets thus far affected the most have been those involving imported goods. Prices for these goods have gone up, as was expected and intended. There has been a moderate, upward drift of food prices in Saigon as well, but it is too early to tell if this is anything more than a tendency for merchants to trade in on consumer uncertainties.

President Thieu is reportedly troubled over the negative reaction of the Lower House to his program. As in any austerity program, there are those who will suffer economic damage and Thieu is concerned that they may organize opposition to his new policy. Thieu is also concerned that the general public will fail to understand the reasons for the austerity measures and will blame him for their troubles. He plans to retain his present cabinet until after the first of the year so that it, rather than a new cabinet, can absorb any heat which might develop.

Communist Developments

Hanoi's continuing concern over President Nixon's upcoming visit to Peking apparently led Hanoi to dispatch Premier Pham Van Dong on a short trip to Peking. Arriving on 20 November, Pham Van Dong probably sought from Chou En-lai reassurances of continued Chinese support plus a pledge that Hanoi's interests and position will be upheld in bilateral U.S.-China discussions. If nothing else, his trip to China enhances the image of Chinese solidarity with Hanoi and will help to allay the worries and confusion that exist within the Vietnamese Communist organization.

Meanwhile, [REDACTED] Le Duc Tho was recently issued a French visa, [REDACTED] In the past Tho's appearance in Paris has heralded new diplomatic initiatives, the most recent being the unveiling of the Viet Cong's seven-points for settling the war. Madame Binh is reportedly still in Hanoi.

~~Top Secret~~